An important new decision out of the Fifth Circuit—Ramirez v. Killian—makes clear that a jury can't decide whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Instead, whether the law is "clearly established" is a question for the judge. Ramirez should have a significant impact on civil rights practice in the Fifth Circuit, and illustrates how the current power of qualified immunity rests on both procedural and substantive decisions.
As Alex Reinert has shown, in most courts, qualified immunity doesn't play much of a role at trial. That makes sense. According to the Supreme Court, officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless prior court decisions held similar facts unconstitutional. Whether such prior decisions exist and clearly establish the law is an objective decision, according to the Court. It is a legal decision that judges, not juries, should make.
But the Fifth Circuit has viewed things differently. In the Fifth Circuit--which includes federal courts in Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana--jurors have regularly been given the power to decide whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity. And Fifth Circuit juries have generously doled out the defense.
On August 15, 2024, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ramirez made clear that juries, not judges, should decide whether the law was clearly established. As the court explained, juries can decide whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. But it falls to the judge to assess whether those rights were clearly established. Furthermore, if a court has denied qualified immunity at summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiff's version of facts shows a violation of clearly established law, there is no basis to grant qualified immunity to a defendant following a jury's verdict on the plaintiff's behalf.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Ramirez is essentially a course correction, putting it in line with the practice other circuits. But it will have significant impact in federal courts in the Fifth Circuit—in Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Take, for example, the case of Tony Timpa—a white Dallas executive who was killed by Dallas police officers who knelt on his neck and back for more than fourteen minutes. Timpa had called the police asking for help—he had anxiety and depression and was off his medication. But instead of helping Timpa, Dallas officers killed him less than thirty minutes after he placed the call. Timpa's mother sued the Dallas officers, and the lawsuit was a multi-year ordeal for many different reasons, including qualified immunity.
Six weeks after Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd, the trial judge in Timpa's case granted the officers qualified immunity, ruling that the officers did not violate clearly established law when they knelt on his neck and back for more than fourteen minutes, until he died. Two years later, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, ruling that “the law had long been clearly established that an officer’s continued use of force on a restrained and subdued subject is objectively unreasonable” and concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Tony Timpa’s family, the officers violated Tony’s clearly established rights.
In September 2023, more than seven years after Dallas police officers killed Tony Timpa, the civil rights case brought by Vicki and other family members went to trial. After a week of testimony and argument, the jury found that three officers who were on the scene violated Tony Timpa’s constitutional rights but awarded qualified immunity to the two officers who knelt on Tony’s neck and back.
The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Ramirez v. Killian could change the result of cases like Timpa. In Timpa, the jury concluded that Tony's constitutional rights were violated after the Fifth Circuit had concluded that there was no qualified immunity for the officers if a jury found a constitutional violation. Before Ramirez, the Timpa jury could essentially overrule the Fifth Circuit, finding qualified immunity despire their conclusion that the officers have violated Timpa's rights. After Ramirez, the jury would not have had that power--the Fifth Circuit's decision, in combination with the jury's verdict, would have meant no qualified immunity for the officers.
To be sure, the ultimate outcome of the Timpa case in a post-Ramirez world could have been the same—had the jury's ultimate goal been to deny Timpa compensation, they could have concluded that Timpa's rights weren't violated at all. But clarifying that judges, not juries, should decide qualified immunity explicitly cabins the power of the defense in a way that is important, given Reinert's finding that that when juries are asked to decide qualified immunity they often award the defense to officers. It also simply makes sense that judges, not juries, make this type of decision.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Ramirez v. Killian is noteworthy for reasons beyond the impact on cases like Timpa. The decision is another indication that the Fifth Circuit—long viewed as the most generous bestowers of qualified immunity—is becoming more reluctant to grant the defense. It also brings to light that some of the most powerful aspects of qualified immunity aren't about the core of the defense but about various procedural protections that come along with it, including the power immediately to appeal qualified immunity denials and the power to limit plaintiff's entitlement to discovery while qualified immunity motions are pending. These procedural effects of qualified immunity deserve top billing when thinking about the impacts of the doctrine, as the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ramirez makes clear.